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his religion behind his back. When Henry Wallace asked Harlan
Stone in 1943 if Murphy had "grown" in his job, Stone replied "He
can no more grow than that stone."Jo Justice Roberts and Judge
Learned Hand referred to him as "the Saint," "St. Francis," or
"Jesus, Lover of My Soul."JI But the Murphy who emerges in this
fine biography was a Justice of unusual courage. He took seriously
his oath to defend the Constitution and did a better job in that respect than any of his colleagues. He was not among those Justice
Jackson had in mind when he penned the following ditty in 1941:
Come you back to Mandalay
And hear what the judges say
As they talk as brave as thunder
And then run the other way.32

ON COURTS AND DEMOCRACY: SELECTED NONJUDICIAL WRITINGS OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT. Edited
by Arthur Selwyn Miller.' Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press. 1984. Pp. xvi, 291. $29.95.

A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL ODYSSEY OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT. By Arthur Selwyn
Miller. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1984. Pp. xiv,
242. $29.95.
Ernest van den Haag2
In Arthur Selwyn Miller, Judge J. Skelly Wright found an
ideal biographer, who shares his understanding, or, I would contend, misunderstanding, of the nature of law and of the role of
judges. In turn Professor Miller has found an ideal person to write
the foreword in Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., with whom he shares
not only a misunderstanding of the function of law, but also a remarkable inability to command the English language. A few in30.
31.
32.

Id. at 249.
ld. at 262, 266.
Id. at 263.

I. Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University; Adjunct Professor of
Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law.
2. John M. Olin Professor of Jurisprudence and Public Policy, Fordham University.
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stances will demonstrate no less. Beyond them, codex ipsus
loquitur.
Judge Johnson's first sentence is "It is indeed a pleasure to
have the opportunity to write about Skelly Wright as a person and
as a judge to serve as a foreword . . . ." On the same page: "I do
not remember the details of the discussion made by this young
. . . . " Judge Johnson's English does not improve through his
three-page foreword. On its last page he writes "Judge Wright will
long be recognized as the role model of how members of our judiciary can and should speak truth to power, to require disinterested
fairness in the face of hysteria . . . ."
Professor Miller's biography tells us practically nothing about
Judge Wright's nonjudicial personality or life. Yet the preface begins by declaring that "this book is a personalized view of . . . ."
His English does not improve through 200-odd pages. Miller expresses his "gratitude ... to [his] wife, Dagmar, who caught many
of my egregious errors in syntax." He should consider divorce.
What else is to be done with a wife who approves of "strains . . .
being leveled against constitutional mechanisms," or again "against
familiar institutions," who lets him write "[h]uman behavior is too
complex to be able to label anyone with a single term" or that
"[j]udges must . . . choose from between these principles"? (He
means, if you haven't guessed, "among these principles.") It would
be tedious to give more examples. You have been warned.
Judge Wright himself usually writes tolerable English, though
he does accuse people of losing interest "in the practical problem of
solving racial discrimination." Miller says of Judge Wright that
"[n]ot having a profound mind, Wright knows what he wants and
relies upon his clerks ... Wright gives the theme and a clerk ...
provides the language." Because I do not believe in guilt by association, I must be agnostic about Judge Wright's command of English.
Let me turn now to the substance of the books, beginning with
Miller's biography.
I

The electric chair did not work properly when the state of Louisiana attempted to execute the murderer William Francis. Wright,
then an attorney in private practice, argued before the Supreme
Court that a second attempt to execute Francis would constitute
double jeopardy as well as cruel and unusual punishment. His first
argument was silly, since Francis was not tried a second time for the
murder. The second argument conceivably had merit, although one
may wonder how, when execution is the sentence, the pain and suf-
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fering of an aborted attempt could take its place. The Supreme
Court rejected the appeal. Francis was executed.
Miller (and Wright?) insists that it was all Justice Frankfurter's
fault: his was "the crucial fifth vote in a 4 + 1 = 5 to 4 decision."
Why single out Frankfurter? I can't see how in a joint decision one
vote is more "crucial" than another. (Perhaps Miller meant "unexpected" when he wrote "crucial." I wouldn't put it past him.)
Anyway, four-to-four would have been enough to confirm the death
sentence. But let that go. Miller writes that "[Frankfurter's] concurrence with the Court majority, rather than being a triumph of
judgment over feeling, is, when coupled with his subsequent secret
efforts to get executive clemency for Willie, an example of intellectual dishonesty." This comment strikes me as an example of
Miller's obtuseness. Justice Frankfurter thought that the law required him to reject the appeal by Francis. He also felt that Francis
should be pardoned. The law may require severity. Charity may
suggest leniency. A pardon (from the French par don-as a gift) is
something donated, not something deserved or legally due. When
you give charity you do not imply that the recipient has earned it.
You follow a feeling of compassion, a charitable impulse. Princes,
presidents, and governors in most societies can make a gift to a
criminal of life, or freedom, even when that life, or freedom, is forfeited by law. A judge, then, may properly decide that statutory or
constitutional norms require him to allow a sentence of death to be
executed. Yet the same judge may also feel that in the case at issue
justice should be (in John Milton's phrase) tempered with mercy.
He may wish to suggest as much to a governor, who has discretion
in the matter, and urge him to offer executive clemency to the criminal. There was no "intellectual dishonesty" in Frankfurter's behavior. There was only a clear and compassionate mind. Miller's
confusion of justice with charity speaks volumes. As will be seen, it
is characteristic of Judge Wright as well.
Miller intimates, correctly I believe, that in Wright's view the
truly important question about judicial decisions is: cui bono (to
whose advantage?) The Romans asked that question to point to the
motive, or interest, of a criminal suspect. A judge, however, was
not supposed to ask this question about the effect of his sentence on
the parties. He was to decide what claims were legally justified. I
wonder whether judges excluding inadmissible evidence and thus, at
times, freeing rapists and murders, ask cui bono? Should they? Do
Miller and Wright really want them to? I have not noticed that
either advocates as much. Wright himself indicates that he judges
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in favor of social justice; the ultimate end of his decisions should be
"goodness," which he equates with "justice."
"Justice," Miller believes, embraces "three conflicting principles: to each according to his rights; to each according to his
deserts; to each according to his needs."J He comments that a sampling of Judge Skelly Wright's "opinions and articles reveals that
his concern for human needs oft-times is at odds with what others,
on and off the bench, view as rights justice." You can say that
again. Miller adds that "what a person deserves can be subsumed
under the rubric of what that person needs." Fiddlesticks.
Consider a foot race in which the winner is to get a prize of
$1000. Contestant Arthur is a rich and athletic young man. He
hardly needs the prize money or the prestige. Contestant Selwyn is
poor and insecure and needs the prize money to pay for an operation for his aged mother. Arthur comes in first. According to the
rules (laws) of the race he deserves the prize although he does not
need it and Selwyn does need it. (Selwyn moreover is good, Arthur
wicked.) Since Miller believes that "what a person deserves can be
subsumed under the rubric of what that person needs" would he, or
Judge Wright, have decided that Selwyn is the winner, or should get
the money anyway, because he needs it?
The criterion of need, far from being able to "subsume" desert,
is altogether irrelevant to it. Consider another hypothetical case. A
rich man claims title to some real estate, or to a bank deposit to
which a very poor and good man claims title as well. Or the
wealthy man wants some money he lent the poor man to be repaid
as agreed. Doesn't the law require courts to disregard need, or
goodness, or cui bono, and to consider only who has a right to the
land, or money, and accordingly deserves it? Otherwise, why
shouldn't the judiciary be drawn from other occupations besides
law? How about social workers? Psychologists?
Of course, the law can give the needy rights based on their
needs; it can order that their needs be regarded as deserving something or other, for instance welfare, to which they then become legally entitled on the basis of their need. But no society is or can be
organized on the basis that desert is determined simply by need.
Even Karl Marx advocated need as a criterion of distribution only
under communism-not under socialism. According to Marxist eschatology, only when scarcity is gone can communism be instituted. 4 Then, and only then, would the criterion of need prevail.
3. A. MILLER, A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE" 8 (1984) (quoting Dr. David Miller)
(emphasis in original).
4. Incidentally, Miller thinks that we have been approaching "the end" of "compara-

1985]

BOOK REVIEWS

473

Marx did not confuse the need criterion with justice or desert, being
smarter, in this respect, than Messrs. Miller and Wrights Almost
every critic of Marx has pointed out what these two gentlemen
blissfully ignore. First: if need is the only criterion, achievement
and merit cannot be rewarded. If they cannot be rewarded, they
will occur less often. If they occur less often, the poor as well as the
rich ultimately will suffer. And second: there is no nonarbitrary
way of determining "needs": Do I need a vacation more than you?
A car? An apartment? How does one decide? And who should do
the deciding?
II

Let me leave now, not without a sigh of relief, Judge Wright's
biographer to consider some of his subject's own writings collected
by Professor Miller under the title A "Capacity for Outrage." Each
of Judge Wright's essays is briefly introduced by Professor Thomas
C. Grey.
In The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society,
Wright explains his view that "nature abhors a political vacuum,"
which the Court must fill if legislatures do not. The Court should
"struggle with social issues" (not, nota bene, legal issues). If "no
one [is] doing [the struggling] at all," then "the judiciary must bear
[sic] a hand ... in such situations." None of these asseverations is
argued. Is "nature" a pseudonym of Judge Wright? What is a
"political vacuum"? (A situation in which the legislature isn't doing the things that Wright wants done?)
Although he never fully addresses the fact that the role he envisages for the Court is legislative, nor the fact that by assuming this
role, the Court, an unelected body, replaces the elected bodies
meant to deal with political issues, Skelly Wright has some remarkable answers to the usual objections to his activist view. These objections, in the first place, overstress the Court's "immunity from
democratic processes." How is that? Voters cannot legally oust
and replace federal judges appointed for life. Wherefore federal
courts are indeed totally immune from the relevant "democratic
processes." For the essence of democracy is the ability of voters to
oust and replace decision makers. The reason for the immunity of
the courts is that it was thought that their decisions would be techtive . . . abundance" since the sixteenth century. He certainly outdoes Malthus who saw
something like this in the nineteenth century, and guessed that it will happen. It hasn't yet
happened although Miller asserts it has been happening for three hundred years. Funny I
hadn't noticed.
5. SeeK. MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM (1938).

474

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 2:469

nical, like those of an engineer, not political like those of a representative. It was thought that judges simply were concerned with the
law-not with needs, or social problems. If they are free to legislate, then they should periodically stand for election. They should
be representative not of the law but of the voters.
But Judge Wright has another even more remarkable answer
to critics of judicial activism. "[T]he Congress and the executive
can annul [the Court's] directives simply by refusing to execute
them." In other words, Wright tells us that courts can invent laws
if they like, and that the executive can refuse to enforce judicial
decisions if it likes. An intriguing view of government by laws, indeed of legal government, indeed of any kind of government. President Eisenhower was misguided when, obeying the courts against
his wishes, he desegregated schools. He should have annulled the
Court's orders by "refusing to execute them." Can you imagine a
more lawless jurisprudence?
Judge Wright also resorts to an odd tu quoque argument. He
tells us that Congress is not an altogether majoritarian and egalitarian institution and thus not quite democratic. It does not represent the voters on a perfectly egalitarian basis and there are
seniority rules, filibusters, and other antimajoritarian features.
Therefore we should not be alarmed by the undemocratic character
of judicial legislation. This is like saying witch doctors are not perfect, but neither are real doctors, so why not choose witch doctors?
The argument is too frivolous to warrant discussion.
I am not suggesting that judging is or can be a mechanical process. In Riggs v. Palmer,6 for example, existing law seemed to lead
to the unjust result that a murderer would inherit from his victims.
Yet the court refused to allow this. It might have been wise for the
court to accept such an undesirable result in one case, thereby inviting the legislature to change the law. However, the common law
tradition does give judges some leeway here, and power (absent in
other legal traditions) to rest their decision on a general principle,
for instance that no offender should profit from his own wrong. Inevitably, judges sometimes make law, especially when they are
called upon to interpret the grand phrases of a constitution. Try as
they may, they cannot wholly eradicate the influence of their
prejudices. Even in construing statutes, the distinction between creating and interpreting law is not always clear. There is a twilight
zone. But this has never prevented people with normal eyesight
from distinguishing night and day, or a well-lit area from a dark one
or, finally, the objects in the well-lit area. However, activist judges
6.

115 N.Y. 506 (1889).
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do not interpret law with the equivalent of normal eyesight. For
them there is only twilight, or night, never day, never a well-lit area,
particularly when they don't like what is visible to persons who
have all their senses. They close their eyes and discover constitutional penumbras, or discern in the fog "evolving standards" that
have evolved in their own minds. They confuse the law that clearly
does exist with what they find desirable, declaring it eo ipso legal.

III
According to Judge Wright, "the Warren Court did not bring
true democracy to America." I think this is true. We had democracy for quite a while before Chief Justice Warren was born. But
why does Wright believe it is the function of the courts to "bring
true democracy to America"? I find no mention of this task, or of
entrusting it to the judiciary, in the Constitution. If there is such a
task, isn't it for the voters to accomplish?
What is Judge Wright's notion of "true democracy"? He is not
very explicit but seems to believe that democracy involves far more
egalitarianism than the Constitution requires. Perhaps his remarks
about the Supreme Court and the younger generation of lawyers
offer a clue: "An institution [he refers to the Supreme Court] that
sits back, always emphasizing its weakness and its reasons for inaction, is unlikely to be in a fighting stance when the tanks roll down
Pennsylvania Avenue." He sees "no point in querulous admonitions that the Court should restrain itself from combatting injustice" because, somehow, these admonitions would make it harder to
fight the tanks. This incredibly childish idea is characteristic of
Judge Wright's jurisprudential thought. How would an activist
court, or any court, be able to fight tanks? Tanks are most likely to
"roll down Pennsylvania A venue" once the rule of law is dead. If
that time comes, lawless judges may deserve part of the blame.
"[N]o amount of experience," Judge Wright avows, "will substantially dull the inspiration of the 1960's." We need scrupulous
judges, receptive to experience, not judges inspired by the 1960's or,
for that matter, by anything but the law.
Judge Wright quotes Anatole France's well-known sarcasm
about the majestic equality of the law, which prohibits rich and
poor alike from sleeping under bridges. This, according to Wright,
shows "the basic fatuousness of the goose-gander approach." What
it really shows is the fatuousness of Anatole France. Of course a
law prohibiting stealing bread, or sleeping under bridges, will burden most heavily those motivated to do either, the hungry and the
poor, and hardly at all those not so motivated, the rich. Similarly, a
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law prohibiting drinking will burden drinkers, not teetotalers, and a
law against tax evasion will only burden taxpayers. Is this
deplorable? The purpose of any criminal law is to restrain those
tempted to engage in crime. One would have thought that a federal
judge could be expected to understand that.
Judge Wright goes on to justify preferential quotas for blacks
because "we cannot overcome our history of enslaving black[s] ...
so quickly." Wherefore "I believe hiring quotas for disadvantaged
minorities no more offend the equal protection clause than does the
progressive income tax." The progressive income tax is indeed debatable. But the debate would be quite irrelevant to quotas. How,
in Heaven's name, can it be constitutional, let alone morally just, to
place a white person at a disadvantage for the sake of advancing a
black one, simply because other white persons in the past placed
other black persons at a disadvantage? Why does that justify disadvantaging a person who had nothing to do with this (and may not
even indirectly and unintentionally have benefited from it), and advantaging another, who also was not involved (and may never have
suffered from past unwarranted discrimination)?
Judge Wright's answer to such questions is to assert that
"Brown fully recognizes, to relieve an inequality with respect to the
Negro was, and is, precisely the purpose of the fourteenth amendment." Wherefore, "recognition of race to relieve an inequality
[doesn't] violate the fourteenth amendment." He confuses relieving
an inequality (so as to produce equality), which was indeed the
point of the fourteenth amendment, at least with respect to some
inequalities, with reversing it, so as to produce the reverse inequality. Preferential treatment of racial minorities, apart from being unconstitutional and immoral, is likely to make the situation worse for
those meant to be helped by the remedy. You don't make men free,
or equal, by making them dependent on political handouts.
According to Professor Miller there "can be no doubt that he
[Judge Wright] made up the law" in the Hobson v. Hansen7 decision, thinking that he was thereby serving "social justice." Here
Professor Miller is right as well as candid. Hobson involved a public school "tracking system" instituted in Washington (as well as
elsewhere) to separate the faster from the slower learners and deal
with each group in the most appropriate manner. Because the
tracking system left most blacks on the slow track, Judge Wright
prohibited it. As a result "white enrollment . . . all but vanished,"
7.

327 F. Supp. 844 (D.C. 1971).
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that is, schools became more segregated than before and "declined
in quality."
Professor Miller opines, in his inimitable fashion, that
"whether such a ruling [upholding tracking] would have improved
the Washington schools is highly improbable." But, of course, it
wasn't the court's business to make the schools better, and certainly
not to make them worse, as Judge Wright did. The court's only
business was to determine whether the tracking system was inconsistent with the Constitution. Judge Wright in his opinion declared
that he had to pay heed to "our common need of the schools to
serve as the public agency for neutralizing and normalizing race relations in this country." What is the legal source of this presumption? Where is the evidence that it is factually accurate?
It is a common mistake to suppose that a man like Skelly
Wright, though perhaps gravely flawed as a judge, would make a
fine Senator. That supposition is true only if we want Senators who
are addicted to implausible nostrums. Note that the German
schools, unsegregated for a hundred years, did not prevent the rise
of anti-Semitism. But the problem in Judge Wright's case is worse
than unrealistic hopes. This is a judge who believes that, by mixing
the slow learners with the fast ones, he can help to "neutralize" and
"normalize" race relations! Does he suppose that slow readers
learn more if the teacher is trying concurrently to teach the fast
readers? Does he suppose that this process will reduce racial stereotypes? That it will lead more white parents to send their children to
integrated, public schools? Cui bono indeed.
Judge Wright has had a long career. It will take us a while to
recover from it.

